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SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY PRIVATE PARTIES:
AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.'
The Supreme Court of the United States has enforced
this amendment by denying the admission of evidence procured by representatives of the government in violation of it.
Like the Commerce Clause,2 the development of judicial interpretation of unreasonable searches and seizures has involved an evolutionary process. The search and seizure
evolution has included an ever-widening spectrum of judicial
pronouncements which point toward the increasing emphasis
upon individual freedom from restraint.
This comment will examine the vitality of the rule established in Burdeau v. McDowell,8 which held that evidence
illegally seized by a private party is not within the realm of
protection afforded to individuals by the Fourth Amendment. In that case, McDowell, an employee of the Farmer's
Bank Building in Pittsburgh, had in his possession certain
documents relating to mail usage. A private detective broke
into McDowell's desk and stole these papers which were
turned over to Burdeau, an agent of the Attorney General,
and used in the prosecution of the defendant on the charge
of mail fraud. The defendant's objection that the admission
of such evidence was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
was overruled by the court, on the ground that the Fourth
Amendment only protects unlawful searches and seizures
by governmental, not private, employees.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

3. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCEPTION

In 1914 the Supreme Court held in Weeks v. United
States,4 that evidence procured as a result of an illegal search
and seizure conducted by federal agents was inadmissible in
federal courts. In that case federal and local officials had
searched Weeks' home and had seized his personal papers.
The court stated that
If letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.'
Although the Weeks case was the first Supreme Court
decision to announce the federal exclusionary rule per se,
the Court had established its attitude toward illegal search
and seizure at least 28 years earlier in Boyd v. United
States,' when the Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of testimonial evidence which was the
product of an unreasonable search and seizure. The Court
per Mr. Justice Bradley stated that the illegal search and
seizure of an individual's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself under the Fifth Amendment. Both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments are extensively interrelated
to the personal security and right to privacy of the citizens,
and in this area they throw light on each other.'
Thus Boyd and Weeks set in motion the judicial cogs
which focused a broad range of interpretation upon illegal
search and seizure. However, in 1921 in Burdeau v. McDowell, our nation's highest court held that the Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures
by governmental authorities, but the Amendment was not intended to be a limitation upon private individuals.8 But
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 393.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Id. at 633.
Burdeau v. McDowell, supra note 3.
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Burdeau did not overrule Boyd. In fact Boyd is still cited
with great reverance by the Supreme Court.' The justification behind this distinction between governmental and private
searches and seizures has been that the Fourth Amendment,
and indeed the entire Constitution, was created to limit illegal and unwarranted sovereign intervention without due
process of law, and not to restrict individual action, regardless of its form. In United States v. Carter,'" the Court
said that the Constitution is merely a limitation on the powers of the government and does not proscribe individual actions; therefore the admission of evidence derived from an
illegal private search did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Just recently Burdeau was reaffirmed by
the Oregon Court of Appeals when marijuana accidentally
found in the defendant's glove compartment by a parking
lot attendant was held to be admissible evidence. 1
ExCLUSIONARY

TRENDS--WEEKS

TO THE PRESENT

When the exclusionary rule in Weeks was handed down,
this marked the first holding that in a federal prosecution
the Fourth Amendment banned the use of evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure. Thirty-five years
later the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado," after announcing that it adhered to the Weeks decision, held that the
exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States and
"that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.""
Fortunately, however, this setback upon the exclusionary rule
was not permanent, for in 1960 the Court reversed Wolf and
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 4 that the protection of the exclusionary rule should also be extended to the states.
In the same term as Wolf, the Court announced its so
called "silver platter doctrine" in Lustig v. United States."
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
United States v. Carter, 35 C.M.R. 467 (1965).
State v. Bryan, 457 P.2d 661 (Ore. Ct. App. 1969).
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Id. at 33.
Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 9, at 643.
Lustig v. United States, 838 U.S. 74, 78 (1949).
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Under this doctrine evidence obtained through an illegal
search and seizure by state officials without any cooperation
of federal officials was admissible in a federal court. However, like Wolf, Lustig was not permanent. In Elkins v.
United States 6 the Supreme Court overruled the "silver
platter doctrine." At present any cooperation between federal and state officials renders the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure inadmissible in the courts of both sovereignties.
Considering the trends involving search and seizure
from another viewpoint, in Olmstead v. United States' the
Court had held by dictum that the admissibility of evidence is
not affected by illegality of the means by which it was obtained. In a dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis, in which
Justice Holmes concurred, it is stated, "To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law that the end justifies the
means ... would bring terrible retribution. Against that per-

nicious doctrine this court should resolutely turn its face."' 8
Thirty-nine years later Katz v. United States 9 overruled
Olmstead in stating, "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
20
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."1

From the preceding it is rather obvious that a radical
change has taken place in the law of search and seizure subsequent to Burdeau. Undoubtedly such a series of overrulings have undermined the basic philosophy behind Burdeau. In fact some federal appellate court judges have suggested that Elkins may have overruled Burdeau." This
comment suggests that the federal courts should reevaluate
Burdeau in terms of contemporary judicial interpretation
concerning the Fourth Amendment and illegal search and
seizure. Since the Burdeau decision the Supreme Court has
looked upon various illegal searches with growing disfavor,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Elkins v. United States, 864 U.S. 206 (1960).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 485.
Katz v. United States, 889 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
See United States v. Williams, 314 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1963)
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and increasingly favors the protection of individuals and
their property rights from unwarranted searches.
A number of state courts have within the last decade
taken a significant step across the governmental v. private
search and seizure gap. In People v. Fieffo,2" a California
court held that a request by a police detective to a hotel manager constituted sufficient government involvement to render
seized narcotics inadmissible."
FUNDAMENTAL INEQUITY-A

TIME FOR CHANGE

When the rule in Boyd was set down, no distinction was
made, either expressly or impliedly, between illegal searches
by individuals or by governmental agents. Consequently
many critics of Burdeau consider the differentiation later
made to be an inherent inequity. The Supreme Court itself
in Miranda v. Arizona pointed out that "to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to
punish an individual produce the evidence against him by
its own independent labors." 4
The interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments has been alluded to already. As early as 1921
a Harvard Law Review article25 expressed the view that just
as the Fifth Amendment protects an individual from selfincrimination, the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect
the individual from unwarranted searches and seizures for
possible evidence of a crime, thus forcing a defendant to give
self-incriminating evidence. Many courts have indicated that
the official status of the intermediary is irrelevant in determining whether the Fifth Amendment has been violated or
not. A confession made under duress and with compulsion
is not admissible, whether made to a police officer or to a
private person. 6 But yet ironically under the Fourth
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

People v. Fieffo, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (3d Dist. 1965).
See also State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1921).
Schaumberg v. State, 432 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1967) ; See also Comment, 3 U.
SAN FRAN. L. REV. 159, 167 (1968).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 5 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 21

658

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. V

Amendment an individaul in a wrongful search may in effect force a person to give up evidence against himself while
under the Fifth Amendment a confession wrongfully received by an individual is inadmissible. 7
Under our adversary system it would seem that unwarranted and unlawful evidence should not be admissible
without a search warrant or voluntary surrender, regardless
of whether a government official or a private party is involved. The distinction between private parties and governmental parties is unwarranted.2 8 If the distinction between
governmental and private searches were abolished, it would
appear that the exclusionary rule would have the same effect
upon private as it does on governmental searches.
As a consequence thereof a decrease in illegal private
searches and an increase in personal privacy should result.29
It is significant that the Supreme Court now recognizes that
the Fourth Amendment creates a "right to privacy, no less
important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." 3"
Critics of the proposed change point out that to hold
privately obtained evidence inadmissible would hinder the
apprehension and conviction of numerous guilty suspects.
Such a ruling would leave store merchants highly vulnerable to shoplifters since at present they are usually searched
and detained by private store detectives."
However, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures. If the Supreme Court were to
extend the perimeter of the exclusionary rule to private
searches, a standard of reasonableness would have to be
adopted. Such a test could be based upon similar standards
used concerning official searches, and by integrating the
"probable cause" limitation into the test.
Because the principles of stare decisis are so thoroughly
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Comment, 3 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 159, 167 (1966).
Comment, 1966 UTAH L. Rav. 271, 276 (1966).
Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 9, at 656.
People v. Rondazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (2d Dist. 1963).
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and completely engrained in the American judicial system,
courts are quite reluctant to overrule well established rules
of law. However, if a separate but related rule can be intertwined with the rule in question, thus giving the Court certain legal justification through reinterpretation, the pain of
overruling can be anestheticized in favor of more equitable
doctrine.
To reinforce the overruling of Burdeau, Shelley v.
Kraemer" can give valuable assistance. In that case the
Supreme Court considered the question whether certain
private restrictive covenants whose purpose was the exclusion
of racial minority groups from property ownership in the
area, were constitutionally enforceable. The Court held that
the enforcement in the courts of the agreements was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said that the judicial enforcement of a
restrictive covenant between private litigants has been sufficient governmental action to bring constitutional limitations into effect.
This can be related to the issue of private searches and
seizures. If the rule in Shelley were applied to this area, the
actions of the judiciary could be interpreted as sufficient government intervention to deny admission in a court the illegally and unreasonably procured evidence seized by a private
As early as 1908 the Supreme Court recognized
person.
that the judicial act of the Court was the act of the State."
In Shelley Mr. Chief Justice Vinson speaking for the majority stated, "That the action of the state courts and judicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action
of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court."" Thus state action refers to the exercise of state power in a variety of forms, whether the power
is legislative, executive, or judicial. When the effect of that
state action is to deny an inherent constitutional right, then
32.
33.
34.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 32, at 14.
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it is unenforeable regardless of the form of that exercise.
Thus but for the active intervention of the judiciary, the petitioner in Shelley would have been free to take possession and
ownership of the property without restraint.8 5
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that the distinction between illegal acts of the government and similar
acts by private individuals has become rather indistinct in
the area of civil rights. Since the decision of Burdeau v.
McDowell in 1921, an entirely new judicial atmosphere surrounding illegal search and seizure has evolved, to the extent
that our federal court system has become increasingly aware
of the inherent rights of property and privacy of the individual. Consequently, the justification behind allowing evidence of illegal searches by private parties to be admissible
in criminal suits is presently of very questionable validity.
One is bound to agree that the efforts of the Court to
punish guilty individuals, although obviously a praiseworthy
and justifiable objective, must not be aided by the sacrifice
of the principles which are the foundation upon which the
law of our land is embodied. Constitutional guarantees under the Bill of Rights cannot be set aside in favor of the unrestricted actions of individuals. "Respect for law will not
be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which
shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play." 8
The Bill of Rights is just what the phrase implies-a body
of legislation establishing the inherent personal rights of individual citizens. If our Founding Fathers had wished these
ten amendments not primarily to protect individuals, but
rather merely to restrict unreasonable governmental interference and no more, the amendments might just as well have
been referred to as the Bill of Restrictions. Constitutional
protection should be afforded to any citizen of the United
States whose property has been illegally searched and seized,
regardless of whether the person performing the unwarranted
35. Id. at 19.
36. Burdeau v. McDowell, supjra note 3, at 477 (dissenting opinion).
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act was acting as a governmental agent or acting on in individual basis. As far as the citizen is concerned, the distinction is inequitable and absurd.
TERRANCE L. O'CONNOR
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